Japan National Security Forum

A forum titled “National security—Japan’s course,” sponsored by The Yomiuri Shimbun was held in Tokyo on April 22. Experts on national security stressed that the government interpretation of the Constitution needs to be revised to allow Japan to exercise its right to collective self-defense. The participants also discussed various challenges Prime Minister Shinzo Abe faces in the security field.

Panelists: Yosuke Isozaki, Special Advisor to prime minister in charge of national security affairs; Akiko Fukushima, Senior fellow of Tokyo Foundation; Takashi Saito, Former chief of Joint Staff; Shinichi Kitaoka, President of International University of Japan

Keynote Speech: Shigeru Ishiba, Liberal Democratic Party Secretary General

Moderator: Hidemichi Katsumata

Proactive contribution in international arena

Kitaoka: The National Security Council was established in early December last year, and the government crafted a national security strategy designed as a guide for NSC discussions. The latest version of the National Defense Program Outline was worked out later the same month to address the task of shaping Japan’s security program in and after 2014.

The concept of this country’s proactive contribution to peace based on the spirit of international cooperation was spelled out in the national security strategy. The idea of proactive contribution to peace is the opposite of “inactive” or “passive” pacifism. Inactive or passive pacifism implies that the Japanese people “have no intention at all to have any armed forces, as we believe this is a certain shortcut to peace,” a proposition that is nothing less than a lie. While there has been no growth in Japan’s defense spending for 20 years or so, a power in our neighborhood [China] has expanded its military outlays to 20 or 30 times the level of two decades ago. It is sheer fallacy to argue the region this country belongs to will be peaceful as long as Japan does nothing wrong.

Fukushima: In a set of policy proposals in March 2000, I suggested Japan should take a path toward proactive contribution to peace. In the 1990s, I was engaged in security studies in the U.S. With the beginning of the Gulf War in 1991, I heard people making remarks critical of Japan such as “Although Japan comes up with the money, it is averse to getting its hands dirty. Japan always wants a free ride as far as national security is concerned.” Hearing demeaning words describing Japan as engaging in “checkbook diplomacy,” I felt deeply frustrated. The crux of my concept of proactive contribution to peace was that doing nothing could no longer be considered proof that a country is peace-loving.

Under the banner of proactive contribution to peace, I believe this country needs to contemplate not only defense, but also multifunctional strategies in a variety of issues.

To cite an example, it is high time to review Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter, which the government adopted in August 2003. The nation’s development assistance strategy should be crafted from a more comprehensive point of view. Ensuring the security of a country or region without making progress on developmental efforts is hardly realistic. My view is that any new Japanese ODA strategy should cover both security and development.

Japan has been earnestly addressing a wide range of activities to spread its “human security” initiative worldwide over the past 10 years. In the international community, an atmosphere has been created in which people first consult with Japan about issues involving human security.

Kitaoka: Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have been sent to Southern Sudan on a peacekeeping mission. If Japan’s SDF troops faced danger, troops from other countries in their vicinity would most likely come to their aid. However, the SDF members would be unable to help other countries’ peacekeeping members if they should be in danger. How can this sort of thing happen? This is simply because activities of SDF members are banned from being linked directly to the use of force by any other country [under the government’s current interpretation of the Constitution].

This is a fundamental mistake. What the first paragraph of Article 9 of the Constitution prohibits is this country’s exercise of force as a means of resolving international conflicts. International conflicts in this context mean, of course, conflicts involving Japan itself.

A large-scale exercise of force is never seen in U.N.-mandated peacekeeping operations, in which only light weapons are used. Because of restrictions on peacekeeping activities, no SDF member can lead an international peacekeeping squad.

Isozaki: Collective security, as stipulated by the U.N. Charter, refers to enforcing sanctions collectively in case of a relevant resolution by the U.N. Security Council. Under such circumstances, there can be no possibility of Japan dropping even one bomb. Japan has stood in the far back of the crowd in the enforcement of sanctions, and I think it is time for this country take one step forward in this regard.

Katsumata: The activities of the SDF in tandem with developmental assistance, will boost Japan’s own security.

Fukushima: Such coordination has actually been taking place, as seen in road construction undertaken by engineering units of the SDF. SDF troops have earned a great reputation for sponsoring seminars on such activities and training local people. Since the SDF’s engineering units have garnered particularly high praise, many other Asian countries have been sending personnel to Japan to learn skills.

Furthermore, SDF troops assigned to road construction in Southern Sudan have been working in cooperation with the local governments concerned, successfully producing a variety of good results.

Gray zone 

Katsumata: The SDF are said to rely on a very weak legal basis for their activities.

Saito: The most important question is how Japan should respond to situations that can be described as hovering in a gray zone—that is to say, circumstances that constitute neither a military emergency nor fully fledged peace. If the nation fails to deal with these circumstances properly, Japan will be left with no choice but to resort to “boei shutsudo” [mobilizing SDF personnel to repel an armed attack], which would amount to the start of a war. This would result from being forced to act without careful consideration.

Take our territorial policing, for example. When a Chinese government ship nears the Senkaku Islands and enters Japanese territorial waters, we can’t know whether they’re armed. Under the current structure of police authority, nothing can be done to prevent the personnel on such a ship from landing on the islands.

This problem can be addressed either by expanding the scope of police authority or broadening the scope of our nation’s right to self-defense. I think the former approach would be the wiser way to approach the problem. Opinions on the issue differ widely, but I believe that the shortcomings [in our nation’s preparedness to cope with emergencies] must be corrected in order to appropriately address such situations.

Kitaoka: If Japan faces a premeditated, large-scale invasion from another country, an order can be issued for SDF troops to be mobilized. This system, boei shutsudo, was conceived based on the premise of a possible invasion of Hokkaido by the former Soviet Union.

However, any aggressor could act in a manner so as to prevent its target from anticipating a large-scale incursion. Outmaneuvering your foe is part of military strategy. If boei shutsudo is firmly established as our nation’s response to an armed attack from a foreign country, then the country would be unable to do anything [helpful for resolving the crisis] after all.

Measures should be implemented to ensure that the country’s right to self-defense can be exercised where necessary—and not necessarily only in the case of a large-scale, premeditated invasion from another country. True, there are two ways to address the situation: Such actions could be approached under the right to self-defense, or through improvements to the capacities of the policing authorities.

Saito: Police authority can provide grounds for both “chian shutsudo” and “keigo shutsudo.” I believe chian shutsudo [an SDF operation aimed at repelling a threat to public security] is not so easily implemented.

Keigo shutsudo came into being in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States on Sept. 11, 2001, aiming to protect SDF facilities and U.S. military installations in this country from acts of terrorism. Under the current structure of the system, the domestic facilities to be defended [through keigo shutsudo] are limited to SDF installations. I believe [the legal provisions relating to keigo shutsudo] should be interpreted more liberally.

Isozaki: It is necessary to consider ahead of time how to address an emergency that stops short of developing into an armed attack. There also is a need to consider from a variety of standpoints how to respond to the possibility of guerrillas landing on Japanese soil.

 Right to collective self-defense 

Katsumata: Why is exercising the right to collective self-defense necessary?

Kitaoka: Any company, organization or nation exists amid competition. And every organization must have the ability to deal flexibly and swiftly with changes to its surrounding environment without losing its identity. An approach that treats the established rules as “Golden Rules” simply because they are rules that have already been decided will not contribute to an organization’s safety and development. From a political science perspective, it’s actually a very destructive attitude.

Now, look at the second paragraph of Article 9 of the Constitution and read what it stipulates.

“...land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.”

It says Japan shall not have armed forces. In 1946, then Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida also stated the same interpretation during a Diet session. However, the Korean War took place on the neighboring Korean Peninsula. Under such circumstances, it became unimaginable for a sovereign state not to have military forces to defend itself.

Consequently, the government changed its interpretation of the Constitution. It came up with a new interpretation according to which, despite the existence of Article 2 of the Constitution, Japan is allowed to possess the minimum level necessary of self-defense power and to exercise it. The Supreme Court has also affirmed that interpretation.

Yet, what is the minimum level necessary? According to the Cabinet Legislation Bureau: “Japan has and can exercise the right to individual self-defense. However, [the minimum necessary] does not include such actions as striking back when our partners or friendly nations are attacked.” But, from any angle, I think it’s obvious that such situations are covered.

Military might—particularly technology—is a very basic condition of security. It poses the big question of whether it is possible to legally define the minimum level necessary without taking into account the development of military technology and the rise and fall of neighboring nations. I think it’s impossible.

Then, is it possible to defend Japan only with the right to individual self-defense? The only option is to closely join forces with a powerful partner. Boosting a close partnership further to enable Japan not to be threatened by countries surrounding us. This makes the right to exercise collective self-defense possible.

People say I’m very proactive about exercising the right to collective self-defense, but it’s not true. I’m against prohibiting exercising the right to collective self-defense. When it comes to exercising it, very careful consideration must be given as to whether it would truly be in Japan’s interest. This is what the government, or the prime minister, should think about. This is vitally important for Japan’s independence as well as its own safety and protection under the current conditions.

Saito: The issue of exercising the right to collective self-defense becomes a considerably larger argument if it is taken very seriously or too far, by raising the question of a constitutional amendment, for instance. I think the issue can be likened to aerial battles. When a war in the air goes on and on, troops on the ground will die. I want the current air battles, which are irresponsible, to stop. If we spend too much time on them, we can’t address the clear and present danger that exists.

The law on contingencies in areas surrounding Japan has been enacted to support U.S. forces if they are dispatched to the Korean Peninsula in the event that an emergency arises there. But in my opinion, there are areas where Japan can’t extend the proper support, and these are precisely the areas that are linked to the right to exercise collective self-defense.

For instance, if the United States were to send fighters into a conflict on the Korean Peninsula from Misawa Air Base [in Misawa, Aomori Prefecture], Japan would not be able to provide fuel or ammunition to the U.S. forces because it would mean Japan is in some way participating in the conflict. Also, if a ballistic missile were launched toward Guam, Japan would not be able to shoot it down, even if it had the capability to do so. An even more serious problem would be if mines were laid in the Sea of Japan. Even if a boat were blown up, Japan would not be able to sweep the sea to clear the mines laid by the other side.

The essence of the problem with exercising the right to collective self-defense is whether we are truly prepared to spill the blood of Japanese soldiers by getting involved in conflicts that are not directly related to Japan’s defense. I think more debate is needed on this point.

However, concerning “contingencies in areas surrounding Japan,” there would be no room for discussion on whether Japan should or should not bleed. If things go poorly, Japan could find itself in the midst of an emergency. In these areas, Japan clearly ought to enable the right to collective self-defense to be exercised.

Moreover, Japan can now provide fuel to other countries’ ships using Self-Defense Forces ships in the Indian Ocean after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, as the Antiterrorism Law was established. However, Japan can provide fuel to U.S. battleships only within its territories in cases of emergencies in areas surrounding Japan. Laws that have become obsolete have not been revised.

Fukushima: Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage has suggested that it is outdated for Japan to restrict itself from exercising the right to collective self-defense.

During my research trips to conflict areas in Africa and other places such as East Timor and Afghanistan, I felt strongly that imposing excessive restrictions [on security policy] could be detrimental to our own safety.

This is not an era in which our only concern should be peace in Japan. We should ask ourselves, “What is needed to maintain peace in a way that is relevant to the present moment?”

Isozaki: During the Cold War, there were superpowers and a world order. But today the United States is finding it very difficult to serve as the “world’s policeman.” How long will the Japan that can’t and won’t do anything be able to last? Japan [should] fulfill a role relative to our position. It doesn’t mean we should go to California [to exercise the right to collective self-defense], even if the U.S. mainland is attacked. The point is, it would be terrible if the United States were engaged in nearby waters to defend us and we couldn’t do a thing.

We must align with not only the United States, but other friendly countries, and use them as a diplomatic card.

What does it mean to change the constitutional interpretation? Establishing the SDF was the biggest postwar change to the interpretation of the Constitution, and was recognized in the [Supreme Court’s] decision on the so-called Sunagawa case in 1959.

In a written answer for Diet deliberations in 1956, the government stated that exercising the right to collective self-defense was prohibited because it would exceed the minimum level necessary of self-defense. Because of Article 9 of the Constitution, there can be no change to “only exercising the minimum level necessary.” But I think it’s OK to change the idea that [exercising the right to collective self-defense] would exceed the minimum level necessary of defense. I’d like Diet members to seriously and properly deliberate the matter in such a way that the public can understand clearly what the right to collective self-defense means in terms of ultimately defending Japan.

It’s not that Japan’s defense level would be on the same level as other countries. We have to consider some constraints, but we’d like to do our best to have Japan take rational measures on the matter.

Katsumata: Some opposition party members are of the opinion that changing the interpretation of the Constitution would be dangerous.

Isozaki: Nothing will happen just by changing the constitutional interpretation. Japan is a nation governed by laws, so revisions of laws would also be necessary—perhaps as many as 10 in all. Exercise of the right to collective self-defense will be realized only after sufficient deliberations by lawmakers at the Diet and the enactment of laws.

The Constitution doesn’t say very much about the right to collective self-defense itself, so there’s not much that can be done there. When exactly [the right can be exercised] can be narrowed down in the discussion of legal revisions. We wouldn’t go to Afghanistan or the United States [to exercise the right to collective self-defense].

Under the current interpretation, the right to collective self-defense cannot be exercised. Since the interpretation of the Constitution is the opinion of the government, it’s natural to use the government’s views to enable the exercise [of the right to collective self-defense]. However, it is absolutely essential that no action would violate the Constitution.

China, South Korea 

Katsumata: Some believe that Japan exercising the right to collective self-defense could provoke China and South Korea, fueling mutual distrust with those two nations.

Isozaki: Both China and South Korea have the right to collective self-defense. The U.N. Charter states that all member nations have the right to individual and collective self-defense. Japan is the only nation in the world debating this issue.

This situation stems from slight differences in the Japanese Constitution that make it appear to ban the use of force entirely. [A change in interpretation] doesn’t mean that Japan will take an aggressive position toward China and South Korea. Given the regional security situation [involving North Korea], Japan, the United States and South Korea must do their utmost to ensure the security of East Asia. Japan must eventually forge cooperative defense ties with South Korea.

The situation with China over the Senkaku Islands [in Ishigaki, Okinawa Prefecture] is somewhat unfortunate, but we hope to settle it as soon as possible. To do so, a summit meeting between our two nations is urgently needed. Through talks between top leaders, we can identify a route forward for solving various problems. It is imperative for the two nations to continue talks, and for Japan to continue thoroughly explaining its stance to China [concerning revisions to the constitutional interpretation of the right to collective self-defense].

Saito: We have to consider issues concerning cyber-attacks. Japan must build cooperative mechanisms at home and frameworks for international cooperation, if we want to address these issues. Even if we set aside the question of whether cyber-attacks should be considered under the right to collective self-defense, the issue should not be dealt with exclusively by the Self-Defense Forces. It’s important to establish a global framework.

Kitaoka: In the realm of security, an enemy will try to take advantage of unguarded moments or areas. It is therefore fundamental to prepare to deal flexibly with every possible scenario. Although Japan has been overtaken by China, it is still the world’s third-largest economic power. The hardware possessed by the SDF is outstanding. I wonder if the SDF shouldn’t be providing somewhat tighter protection for the nation. If there are people who threaten our peaceful, stable society, we have to be prepared to deal with them. The question should not be about how the Constitution should be interpreted, but how Japan can protect itself.

From the Yomiuri Shimbun